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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

****************
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INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
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ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
a National Association,
Defendant and
Respondent,
FRANKLIN D. JOHNSON and
KATHLEEN JOHNSON, his wife;
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LAND COMPANY, a partnership;
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Third Party and
Additional Party
Defendants.

****************
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

****************
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-appellant United American Life has reargued all of the facts
as though the trial court found in its favor, to-wit: that there was an agreement
made by Wayne Hintze for and on behalf of Zions First National Bank (herein
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"Bank") that it would agree to release its Trust Deed lien on the Bar-7o Ranch fr,
$50, 000. 00 when the unpaid balance on the loan was $150, 000. 00. The Court,

I

after submission of Findings of Fact in May CR .132) , Objections to Findings of
Fact filed by appellant CR .148) , then final Amended Findings of Fact, signed OVf:
plaintiff's objections on June 17, 1980 CR .142-147) , found that there was no
agreement, no meeting of the minds; that the only agreement was that the Bank

1

would release its Trust Deed lien only in the event it received payment in full.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On November 13, 1968, Bar 70 Ranches, Inc., a Nevada corporatj
and Franklin D. Johnson, Glendon E. Johnson and Clifton I. Johnson borrowed&.:
sum of $150, 000. 00 from Zions First National Bank, which loan was secured by'
Trust Deed constituting a first lien on real estate in Grand County, Utah (hereir

I
called the "Bar 70 Ranches" and more particularly described in the Trust Deed.

1

Exhibit 4), together with all water rights, including the certificates and applicat1
of appropriation as described in the Trust Deed .
,I

2. The loan was also made upon the parties executing a Purchase"':
Sale Agreement dated November 18, 1968, whereby United American Life InsurfilJ
Company of Denver, Colorado (herein called "United American Life"), agreed tc

I

purchase the loan from the Bank on November l, 1970. The commitment of Unite:;
American Life was extended for another 12 months by letter dated March 9, 19 71
3. On November 24, 1971, the Purchase and Sale Agreement where'']
I

United American Life agreed to purchase the loan was substituted by a Purcha
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and Sale Agreement executed by Howard Life Insurance Company, a Colorado
corporation. The balance on the loan still remained at $150, 000. oo.
4. In April, 1973, and August, 1973, the borrower executed
Extension and Modification Agreements which changed the rate of interest and
extended the time of payment until July l, 1978, when the entire balance was to
become due and payable.
5. Commencing August 6, 1973, and continuing through December 10,
1973, Franklin D. Johnson, the principal borrower, and Wayne

s.

Hintze, Senior

Vice President of Zions First National Bank, exchanged correspondence regarding
payment of $75 ,000. 00 on the loan and amortizing the balance of $75 ,000. 00 over a
five-year period. On December 10, 1973, Franklin D. Johnson visited Wayne S.
Hintze in his office, and Mr. Hintze made a memorandum of their discussions,
which reads as follows:
Today Mr. Franklin Johnson indicated that he would be able
to pay $75 ,000 on the principal of the subject loan reducing
it to $75, 000, that then he would ask that the balance of the
$75 ,000 be taken over by our Commercial Loan Department
with the understanding that they would pay $25, 000 within
30 days and the balance of $50 ,000 within a 90-day period on
a personal loan to he and Glendon Johnson.
/s/

Wayne S. Hintze, Vice President
(Exhibit 41)

Mr. Hintze agreed that Zions First National Bank would release its Trust Deed lien
on the Bar 70 Ranches property when and if the Bank received full payment.
6. Sometime in December, 1973, Mr. Franklin D. Johnson and United
American Life agreed to a refinancing package wherein United American Life agreed
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to advance an additional $185 ,000.00 in addition to a prior loan of $675 ,OOO.Oow
1

it had with Johnson Land Company on property known as the East Oaks Compan,;
Weber County, Utah, provided it be given additional collateral on three parcels·
property, including a first lien on the Bar 70 Ranches property. In January, H:i
United American Life mailed a check of $152, 816. 98 to Title Insurance Agency oq
Lake City, Utah, with instructions to pay $50, 000. 00 to Zions First National Bani
By letter dated January 2, 197 4, United American Life advised Title Insurance ,
Agency that " . . . there is a lien due to Zions First National Bank in the amount·!
$150, 000. 00. It is understood that this lien may be released upon payment of
$50 ,000. 00 to the Zions First National Bank." On January 23, 197 4, a Trust De~
executed by Glendon E. Johnson, Franklin D. Johnson and their wives to United
American Life covering the Bar 70 Ranches property in Grand County, utah,

w~

recorded by Title Insurance Agency acting for and on behalf of United American

!

I

Life. The Trust Deed was dated December 28, 1973. Title Insurance Agency wr,:i
a title insurance policy insuring that the Trust Deed lien of United American Lif1
was a first lien upon said property, which title policy was effective January 23.;
1974.
7. On January 25, 1974, Title Insurance Agency drew a check inti'
sum of $50 ,000. 00 payable to Zions First National Bank, which contained the
following language on the voucher portion of the check:
Printed: Attached check is in settlement of accounts
listed hereon, before depositing detach this
DUPLICATE VOUCHER and retain for your
records . If not correct , return .
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-5Typewritten: Payment in full of Trust Deed dated
November 19, 1968, executed by Bar 70
Ranches, Inc. , recorded November 20, 1968,
as Entry No.
, in Book 170, Pages
198-200.
At an unknown date subsequent to January 25, 1974, Mr. George Robinson of
Title Insurance Agency went to the office of Wayne S. Hintze at Zions First National
Bank, Head Office, One South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, and delivered
said check either to Mr. Hintze or his secretary stating that this was for the Johnson
deal. There was no accompanying letter with the check, nor any request made to
Mr. Wayne Hintze to deliver a reconveyance of the Trust Deed of Zions First
National Bank against the property.
8. Wayne S. Hintze examined the check but neglected to note at that
time the language contained in the voucher portion of the check. He was surprised
the check was for $50,000.00 instead of $75,000.00 which was discussed with
Franklin D. Johnson on December 10, 1973. Mr. Hintze instructed his subordinates
to hold the check and wait and see if Franklin D. Johnson brought in additional
funds.
9. The check for $50, 000. 00 was deposited by mistake by some person
other than Wayne S. Hintze, acting for the Bank on March 1, 1974, with a stamped
endorsement and no personal endorsement on the back .
10. On June 12, 1974, an additional $25,000.00 was paid by Franklin D.
Johnson, which payment was applied on the loan.
11. The Court finds that there was no meeting of the minds between
Franklin D. Johnson and Wayne S. Hintze that the Trust Deed would be reconveyed
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for the sum of $50, 000. 00 or for the sum of $75, 000. 00; that Mr. Hintze at all tirni
was only willing to reconvey the Trust Deed lien with the understanding that thi
real estate loan of $150, 000. 00 would be paid in full.
12. On December 21, 1976, Johnson Land Company by Franklin D. '
Johnson conveyed the Bar 70 Ranches property to United American Life, which
Warranty Deed was recorded January 4, 1977. On said date the principal balanc1,
owing by Johnson to Zions First National Bank was the sum of $83, 906. 23. The
Warranty Deed did not refer to or except the prior Trust Deed lien of Zions First
National Bank. On or about January 4, 1977, Title Insurance Agency wrote an
owner's policy of title insurance insuring that United American Life owned the
premises without reference to the existing Trust Deed lien of Zions First

Nation~

Bank.
13. On or about January 4, 1977, the officers and agents of Title
I

Insurance Agency knew that the Trust Deed lien of Zions First National Bank wa•,
still of record but no written demand or request was made for the reconveyance'
said Trust Deed lien.
14. The loan became delinquent and on March 31, 1978, Zions Fir:!:
National Bank recorded its Notice of Default against the Bar 70 Ranches propert:i.
which foreclosure was halted by the Temporary Restraining Order applied forb< I
United American Life and granted by this Court upon oral argument heard June ii,
1978. The balance of $83, 906. 23 with accrued interest of $31, 850. 00 and late
charges of $12, 515. 63 to the date of trial and the attorney's fees incurred to dal!~
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the sum of $8 ,200. 00 have not been paid. The Court finds that the amount of
attorney's fees incurred to date are reasonable (R.142-146).

The plaintiff states in its Brief that the loan was a problem loan, and
argues that there should be some kind of an estoppel enforced in favor of the plaintiff and against the Bank. Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, the loan by the Bank
was well-secured by 1,000 acres of land (Bar-70 Ranches on the Green River),
plus 22 second feet of water (Certificate for 10 c .f .s.; Application of Appropriation
for 12 c. f. s.) . (See Exhibit 4 and Tr. 31, 35.) The Bank had a first Trust Deed
lien on collateral worth a great deal more in value than $150, 000. 00. The Bank did
not want to foreclose, and Wayne Hintze testified that he was anxious if possible to
help Mr. Johnson (Tr .149) . The agreement between the Bank and Frank Johnson
was clearly set forth in five written exhibits, Nos. 34, 36, 37, 39 and 41. The
background to these letters and the memorandum written by Hintze on December 10,
1973, is that the loan for $150 ,000. 00 had been a two-year loan with no provisions
for monthly amortization (Exhibit 3). From November, 1968, to March 1, 197 4
(5-1/2 years), no principal reduction had been made on the loan (Tr.132). All
that Frank Johnson had been able to do was to pay the interest on the loan. The
loan by the Bank was originally based upon a Purchase and Sale Agreement by
plaintiff to buy the loan from the Bank (Exhibit No. 5) . Plaintiff reneged on this
commitment (Exhibit 18 ,20) -- "they had made so many commitments all over the
western part of the United States that they were broke" (Tr.25). Then Frank
Johnson bought a project known as the East Oaks building in the mouth of Ogden
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Canyon from plaintiff (Tr. 48) because he was told that this would help him get
some money to finance the Terracor development of Bloomington. Johnson couJc
not make the payments to plaintiff on the East Oaks property, because the prope::,
later purchased by Terracor in Stansbury (Tooele County) had turned out to be
I

very tough property, and United American had over-committed itself and couldr,,
live up to any of its commitments (Tr. 50) .
Frank Johnson testified as follows:
Q.
Now, I am aware -- isn't it a fact that there
are mortgages finally on the Stansbury project that total
$28 million?

A.
Oh, I'm sure there is. Yes. Well, I'm not
positive. When I left Terracor -- when we reached a
settlement in Terracor in 1972, at the end of '72, there
was approximately $11 million that had been put into
Stansbury.
Q.
And while Bloomington was a success,
Stansbury turned out to be quite a disaster?

A.

Yes. People did not want to live there.

Q.
All right. Then wasn't it a fact that you also
had some discussions with Wayne Hintze about how you
were doing overall on these other projects?

A.

Yes, we did.

Q.
That Wayne Hintze knew that you were
heavily involved in real estate development and had loans
at many banks in many different insurance companies
that you obtained through your brother , Glendon?

A.
That's right. I think Wayne was -- Yes.
think that's right. (Tr. 42; emphasis added)
It is clear from the evidence that Hintze knew that Frank Johnson 11 '
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very very heavily indebted on many loans at other banks and insurance companies.
And Frank Johnson knew that Hintze knew of his financial predicament. Frank
Johnson's financial difficulty and the Bank's knowledge of Frank's predicament
is the reason that Frank did not ask for a reconveyance, without full payment on
his Trust Deed Note, and why he never applied at the Commercial Loan Department
of the Bank to obtain an unsecured loan. It is the reason why Wayne Hintze testified:

"Q. But he needed the release then, did he not? A. Well, he couldn't get

that because he hadn't paid the money. No way do we release when we've still got
a loan outstanding" (Tr .162) .
Thus, in August, 1973, Johnson wrote to Hintze that he was selling a
piece of property in September so "we could reduce the amount owed on the Green
River ranch by $75, 000. 00. We would then be able to make a pay-out on the ranch
over a five year period" (Exhibit 34). No mention was made of any release of the
Bank's Trust Deed lien on the Green River ranch. On the basis of this request
Hintze agreed to release the commitment of Howard Life Insurance Company (Exhibit 36) . This was a successive replacement agreement to buy the loan from the
Bank (Exhibit 24). Johnson had procured the Howard Life commitment to buy the
$150, 000. 00 loan at the Bank, after United American Life reneged and failed to
perform on its original commitment (Exhibit 5) . Johnson replied to Hintze on
October 30, 1973, that the sale of our Ogden property was not yet concluded
(meaning East Oaks -- purchased from plaintiff) and asked for "an extension of
the period of the time until December 7 to pay the remaining $75, 000. 00" (Exhibit
37) . Hintze replied on November 14, 1973, that the Bank would agree to a
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$75, 000. 00 principal reduction and then Frank "would start a regular monthly

payment of $1, 594. 00 . . . This would then pay the loan in full within a five-y.

1

period after the $75, 000 has been applied." Thus, there were to letters writteq
Johnson (Exhibits 34 and 37) and two letters written by Hintze (Exhibits 36 a~q
none of which mentioned any release of the Bank's Trust Deed lien for partial p:;;
ment only.

All of the letters led up to the critical conference between Frank Jc~

and Wayne Hintze on December 10, 1973.
!

Wayne Hintze made a memorandum of that conversation which

is~

follows (Exhibit 41):
MEMORANDUM

TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:

December 10, 1973
FILE
Wayne S. Hintze, Vice President
Bar 70 Ranches

Today Mr. Franklin Johnson indicated that he would be able to
pay $75 ,000 on the principle [sic] of the subject loan reducing ,
it to $75, 000, that then he would ask that the balance of the
$75, 000 be taken over by our Commercial Loan Department with
the understanding that they would pay $25 ,000 within 30 days ani I
the balance of $50, 000 within a 90 day period on a personal loan j
to he and Glendon Johnson.
/s/ Wayne S. Hintze, Vice President
The loan balance at that time was still $150, 000. 00. It is clear thi',
Frank Johnson, by asking that the balance of $75 ,000. 00 be taken over by our~
Bank's) Commercial Loan Department was not requesting a release of the Tru::l
lien from the Real Estate Doan department for less than full payment. The
found:
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Mr. Hintze agreed that Zions First National Bank would release
its Trust Deed lien on the Bar 70 Ranches property when and if
the Bank received full payment. (Finding of Fact No. 5, R .144)
Trial was seven years later in July, 1980. Memories had dimmed but
not the content of letters and memos. Frank Johnson testified that plaintiff was becoming very edgy because they could see we had financial difficulties and were
having a hard time paying (for the East Oaks property) (Tr.51), so Johnson and
plaintiff worked out a deal to refinance the East Oaks project at the mouth of Ogden
Canyon and give plaintiff additional collateral in a Sanpete County property, and
in property called LaRue in Colorado, and they wanted a first mortgage on the,

property at Green River, Utah (Tr. 51). Plaintiff wanted a first lien on the Bar 70
Ranches . . . and we agreed to try and get it for them (Tr. 52). See the details of
this Loan Modification Agreement in Exhibit 44. Johnson stated on his direct examination that" . . . the conversation (with Wayne Hintze) I think was ambiguous.
That was what I stated and I cannot recall totally what Mr. Hintze stated" (Tr. 26) .
Frank Johnson did not testify that he told anyone at the Title Insurance
Agency that he had an agreement with the Bank that they would release the lien
upon payment of $75, 000. 00 or $50, 000. 00, or any conversation at all. The title
company did not offer testimony that Johnson told them the Bank would release its
lien. The title company got their information from plaintiff in a letter dated
January 2, 1974 (Exhibit 45), which states cryptically:
. . . there is a lien due the Zions First National Bank in the
amount of $150, 000. It is understood that this lien may be released upon payment of $50 ,000 to the Zions First National Bank.
No one called or wrote to Wayne Hintze to confirm whether this was true or not.
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The Trust Deed by Frank and Glendon Johnson to plaintiff to secure a new

adv·~

of $185 ,000 .00 had already been executed on December 28, 1973 (Exhibit 43)
The title company had letters confirming in writing their payment>i
the Speicker property in Colorado (Exhibit 38) and wherein Richard Christens0l
agreed to release the LaRue Colorado property upon receipt of $50, 000. 00 (Exkui
40). Yet, Reese Howell, an attorney and title examiner for Title Insurance Agee~
testified that he thought he had called someone at the Bank; that "I would havq
I have a letter from United American Life saying that the payoff to Zions

First~,.

tional Bank for reconveyance would be $50 ,000. Could you verify that figurefo
please? That's what I would have requested" (Tr. 98). He couldn't rememberil
he talked to, whether it was a man or a woman, and he understood banking wet
enough that it takes someone really in charge of the entire department, not just.
payoff clerk, to authorize the release of the Trust Deed for $50, 000. 00 where u•
amount due is $150,000.00 (Tr.100). He did not think he talked to WayneHint1e.
Mr. Howell testified:
At that time I did not know there was any additional
monies owed * * * There might very well be but I probably assumed it might have been a payoff in full (Tr .108).
Title Insurance Agency recorded the Trust Deed from the Johnson;:!
plaintiff on January 23, 1974, and Title Insurance Agency wrote a policy of title
insurance on January 23, 1974, without showing the Trust Deed lien to theB 31i
(Tr.90). The check for $50,000.00 was dated January 25, 1974.

Mr. George

Robinson on an unknown date delivered the check to the office of Wayne Hintze::
the Bank. He thought he delivered it to Wayne Hintze, or to his secretary·
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instructions would have been, "Give this to Wayne. This is the Frank Johnson
check transaction that we were handling and Wayne knew all about it" (Tr .119).
There was no written letter or instructions other than the notation on the voucher
portion of the check (Exhibit 76):
Payment in full of Trust Deed dated November 19, 1968,
executed by Bar 70 Ranches, Inc. recorded November 20,
1968, as Entry No.
in Book 170, Pages 198-200.
Our Order No. 33743.
Wayne Hintze testified , and the trial court found that he examined
the check but neglected to note at that time the language contained in the voucher
portion of the check. He was surprised the check was for $50, 000. 00 instead of for
$75,000.00 which was discussed with Franklin D. Johnson on December 10, 1973.
Mr. Hintze instructed his subordinates to hold the check and wait and see if
Franklin D. Johnson brought in additional funds. The check for $50, 000. 00 was
deposited by mistake by some person other than Wayne S . Hintze , acting for the
Bank on March 1, 197 4, with a stamped endorsement and no personal endorsement
on the back. On June 12, 197 4, an additional $25, 000. 00 was paid by Franklin D.
Johnson, which payment was applied on the loan (Findings of Fact No. 8, 9 and
10; R .145) .
The Court found that there was no meeting of the minds between
Franklin D. Johnson and Wayne S. Hintze that the Trust Deed would be reconveyed
for the sum of $50,000.00 or for the sum of $75,000.00; that Mr. Hintze at all times
was only willing to reconvey the Trust Deed lien with the understanding that the
real estate loan of $150, 000. 00 would be paid in full (Findings of Fact No. 11; R .145).
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POINT I
THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT Ai'rn NO MEETING OF THE
MINDS, NO CONSIDERATION PAID FOR At'ff RELEASE OF
THE BA.t'\/K'S TRUST DEED SECURING A LIQUIDATED
UNDISPUTED AMOUNT, HENCE NO ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION
To state the plaintiff's case on appeal in its simplest terms, it is thi;
Once the Bank cashed the check, which voucher portion stated "payment in full
of Trust Deed . . . " then there was a legal binding agreement for the Bank to
reconvey its Trust Deed lien. This is claimed to be so notwithstanding the fact
that Frank Johnson proposed that he pay the loan in full. When Frank Johnson
proposed to Wayne Hintze " . . . that he would be able to pay $75 ,000 on the
principal of the subject loan reducing it to $75, 000, that then he would ask

that~

balance of the $75 ,000 be taken over by our Commercial Loan Department
. . . " (Exhibit 41) , he knew the difference between the real estate and commer~
loan departments of the Bank (Tr. 64). He knew that Wayne Hintze dealt in
secured loans (Tr.65) in the Real Estate Loan Department of the Bank (Tr.10).
Frank Johnson proposed his own method of full payment on the $150, 000. 00 Tru;; j
Deed Note (Exhibit 41).
This Court, as it stated in Tates, Inc. vs. Little American Refi~
Co., 535 P. 2d 1228, must assume that the trial court believed those aspects ofn'
evidence which may be deemed to support his findings and judgment, citing
Memmott vs. United States Fuel Co. , 22 Utah 2d 356, 453 P. 2d 155. In the
instant case, the trial court found that Mr. Hintze at all times was only willing ti
reconvey the Trust Deed lien with the understanding that the real estate loan oi
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$150, 000. 00 would be paid in full CR .145); that there was no accord and satisfaction
reached between Franklin D. Johnson or the agents of Title Insurance Agency with
Wayne S.

Hintze of the Bank (R .146). United American Life or Title In-

surance Agency never talked to or wrote to Wayne Hintze to tell him that this money
was being paid by plaintiff. Hintze had no knowledge of the letter written by plaintiff to Alton Lund of Title Insurance Agency (Exhibit 45 , paragraph 4d.) , that it
was plaintiff's understanding that the lien of $150, 000. 00 may be released upon payment of $50 ,000. 00 to the Bank. Wayne Hintze knew that the check was to apply on
the Bar-70 Ranches loan because George Robinson, when he delivered the check co
Hintze's office said, "This is the Frank Johnson check transaction that we were
handling and Wayne knew all about it" (Tr .119). Johnson's letters in the Bank
file told Mr. Hintze (Exhibit 37) about selling his Ogden property, and all that
Hintze knew was that the payment was made by the title company, presumably as
agent for Frank Johnson. There is no evidence that Hintze knew that the
$50, 000. 00 came from the same United American Life that had reneged on the
original agreement to purchase the loan from the Bank on the 1st day of November,
1970 (Page 3 of Exhibit 5). Nobody claims they informed Mr. Hintze that United
American Life was now trying to pay off the Bank in full, by payment of $50 ,000. 00.
There is no evidence in the record to support the statement in Appellant's Brief at
page 18 that Hintze "knew the check had been funded by United American Life
. . . and that pursuant to its terms and his past business experience, United
American Life required as a condition of the payment, Zions First National Bank's
reconveyance of its Deed of Trust." No one from United American Life ever
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appeared or testified at trial. It is now the owner of the property with an owm;,
title insurance policy (Exhibit 66; Tr. 6; Tr. 68). Counsel for appellant stated
his opening remarks that Chicago Title Insurance Company (the underwriter for
Title Insurance Agency of Utah) is behind the plaintiff "this is where the moneyi;
in this case, so to speak . . . "

(Tr. 6) .

There was no agreement, no meeting of the minds; no accord and
satisfaction. The trial court's findings are clearly sustained by the weight of
the evidence. The plaintiff-appellant tries on appeal to convince the Supreme
Court differently without arguing forthrightly that the findings are not supportec
by the evidence .
To constitute an accord and satisfaction, there must be an agreemen1
and there must be consideration. In Tates, Inc. , supra, the Court stated:
Ordinarily, the payment of part of a debt does not discharge
it; and this is true even though the paying debtor exacts a
promise that it will do so. The reason for this is that in
making the part payment, the debtor is doing nothing more
than he is legally obligated to do, and therefore he gives
the creditor no consideration for the promise that the part
payment will be accepted to discharge the entire debt.
In Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 94 Utah 532,
72 P. 2d 1060, this court stated:
There must be consideration for the agreement. Settlement
of an unliquidated or disputed claim where the parties are
apart in good faith presents such consideration. Where the
claim is definite and no dispute but an admittance of its
owing, the agreement to take a lesser amount even followed
by satisfaction is not good unless attended by some consideration. In this case we do not see the elements of an
accord and satisfaction.
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Here, there was no disagreement between Frank Johnson and the Bank
that the debt was $150, 000. 00, and that the debt was secured by a first Trust
Deed lien on the Bar-70 Ranches property (Exhibits 3 and 4). It was a liquidated
debt, not disputed. The ranch with its appurtenant 22 second feet of water rights
in the Green River (Tr. 35) was of great value. Appellant argues, without citing
any evidence in the record, that the Bank was in a situation similar to that of
Sugarhouse Finance Co. vs. Anderson, 610 P. 2d 1369. In the Sugarhouse case
the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that there was an accord and
satisfaction; that the acceptance of a check for $2, 200. 00 as full payment on a
judgment originally for $2,423.86 plus interest, costs and attorney's fees known
to have been obtained by Anderson's borrowing the money from a third party
constituted consideration. The important distinction is that the parties had several
meetings and conversations , all of which led to a clear agreement that Sugarhouse
Finance would accept $2, 200. 00 in full satisfaction of the judgment. Anderson
owned a 12-acre tract in Sevier County, Utah, jointly with another party which was
otherwise encumbered such that he hoped to receive no more than $2, 000. 00 from
the transaction (610 P. 2d at p .1371) . It was this uncertainty of being able to
collect the difference between $2 ,200. 00 and $2 ,438. 86 that led the trial court
and the Supreme Court to hold that consideration existed for the undisputed
accord which was reached. The finance company clearly reneged on an agreement
to accept $2, 200. 00, which Anderson borrowed from a third party.
United American Life never pleaded any accord and satisfaction,
nor did it plead any promissory estoppel in its Complaint (R .1) wherein the
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Bank's Trust Deed sale was temporarily enjoined, nor in its Amended

Compl~r

(R, 79), nor in any Reply to the Bank's Counterclaim (R. 62). Normally, accorr
and satisfaction is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded. Hintze vs

-----c:.

Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 437 P .2d 202; Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

B(c); ~

Financial Corp. vs. Build, Inc. , 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P. 2d 670. Even though pl~
tiff did not plead accord and satisfaction , it had the burden of proof, on this

affirmative defense oto show all of the essential elements. There was no evider.<a
produced by plaintiff to show that the value of the Bar 70 Ranch was less than
$150, 000. 00; that the Bank was unsecured or uncertain at all of being able to
collect in full by foreclosure of its first lien on the 1, 000 acres and 22 second feet
of water rights . Wayne Hintze testified that he had no recollection of Fran¥. Johls
saying he was having problems with United American Life (Tr .149); he was an~c
if possible, to help Mr. Johnson (Tr .149). He wanted to avoid foreclosure,

il~a

sible (Tr.150). But the reason for this attitude was that he knew Frank Johnsci
was in financial difficulty (Tr .152) and that foreclosure by the Bank would lik<li
cause Johnson to lose the equity in the property which existed over and abovellil
amount of the $150, 000. 00 first lien. It is absolutely untrue and completely lacJn
in evidence for appellant to state that the Bank was in a precarious situation in
collecting its loan by foreclosing on its collateral. Appellant filed its Notice 01
Default against the property on March 30, 1978, setting forth the unpaid balance
of $73 ,591. 87 (R .12) , giving credit to Johnson for the $75, 000. 00 which had b~a
applied on the loan.
When Hintze received the check for $50, 000. 00, he instructed h15
. " to ho1d the check until
. Frank brought m
. the rest of t h e money " (Tr , 15~!
office
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That's why the check was not cashed as soon as we received it" (Tr .155). The
check dated January 25, 1974, was cashed March 1, 1974 (Tr.137). Mr. Hintze,
on cross-examination by counsel for the appellant, stated:
No way do we release when we've still got a loan
outstanding (Tr .162) .

***
What would prohibit me on a 30-year mortgage saying
"payment in full on a monthly statement," and the bank
just automatically cashing the check. Does that mean
I'm relieved from my mortgage?
Q.

Well, maybe.

A.

Well, I'll try it then. I'll try it and see.

THE COURT: I don't think you'd get away with it.
Mr. Garrett: No, I don't either.
The Witness: I don't either.

(Tr .164)

Appellant submitted Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Request for Amendments (R .148), but appellant's request for amendments made no suggestion of any way that the trial court could find that payment
of $50, 000. 00 was consideration for release of the collateral security for
$150,000.00. The suggestions in Appellant's Brief (second paragraph at page 25)
that somehow there was consideration given to the Bank are ridiculous.
The trial court concluded that there was no consideration given to
the Bank to impose any obligation upon it to reconvey the Trust Deed lien upon
payment of $50, 000. 00 only (R .147).
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A review of the many Utah cases on accord and satisfaction

(1) We

show that somebody tried to back out of a definite deal. To enforce the agreemi:,

1

against such party, there had to be a clear agreement and a consideration for
such party giving up the balance of his payment.
The following definition from Vol. 1, American Jurisprudence,
Accord and Satisfaction,

§ l,

Page 301, succinctly states the rule:

To constitute an accord and satisfaction there must
be an offer in full satisfaction of the obligation, accompanied
by such acts and declarations as amount to a condition that
if it is accepted, it is to be in full satisfaction, and the condition must be such that the party to whom the offer is made
is bound to understand that if he accepts it, he does so subject to the conditions imposed.
If any businessman would reflect a moment on why would any bank

release its collateral securing a loan of $150, 000. 00 upon payment of $50 ,OOU,i
would seem necessary for a title company, or third party to telephone or write
to the bank, and confirm such an agreement in writing. We are dealing in this
case with a title company , and a bank, two competent capable business entitie:
The entire difficulty with this case is that the title company wrote a title policy
insuring that United American Life had a first lien upon the property (January~J
1974) before it even issued the check (January 25, 1974) without any le:tteror
written confirmation that the Bank would accept such an (unmade) proposal. The ti

(1)
Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d
1060; Ralph A. Badger & Co. vs. Fidelity Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 94 Utah 97.,
75 P. 2d 669; Bennett vs. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 utah 2d 186' 411
P.2d 761; Hintze vs. Seaich, 20 utah 2d 275, 437 P.2d 202; Tate's, Inc.~
Little America Refining Co., 535 P. 2d 1228; Sugarhouse Finance co. v~
Anderson, 610 P. 2d 1369.
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written confirmation that the Bank would accept such a dubious offer. The title
company had represented Frank Johnson on all of his title work at Bloomington
and Stansbury (Tr.54). By January, 1974, they had to know that Frank Johnson
was in serious financial difficulty. The title company had in its file, letters in
writing confirming that Frank Spiecker (Exhibit 38) and Richard Christensen
for Capital Thrift and Loan would accept the payments of some $52 ,000 .00 and
$50, 000. 00 respectively as full payment for their respective trust deeds. No explanation has ever been given why the title company dealt so haphazardly with
the Bank. It wasn't worth the time to write a letter; it wasn't worth the time for
George Robinson, when he delivered the check, to wait and explain that the
title company insisted upon obtaining a release of the Trust Deed on the Bar-70
Ranches property, before the check could be cashed by the Bank. Had
Mr. Robinson, or the title company, by letter, clearly insisted on a reconveyance, Mr. Hintze testified that "I would have handed (the check) back to the
man right then." Q: And said what? A: We will not accept it as full payment."
(Tr .156) .
Because the trial court found there was no accord and satisfaction,
the statute of frauds, pleaded by the Bank was never reached as the decisive
point of law in this case. The statute provides:
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. --No
estate or interest in real property, other than leases for
a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power
over or concerning real property or in any manner relating
thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered
or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law , or
by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party
I
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creating, granting, assigning , surrendering or declaring
the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by
writing. (25-5-1 U .C .A. 1953)
It is submitted that the statute of frauds requiring a deed or a

mortgage creating an interest in real property to be in writing also requires
with equal dignity the surrender of such mortgage, or trust deed to be in
writing, subscribed by the party surrendering the same. The machine-stamped
endorsement on the back of the check does not constitute a subscribing in writini
by the party surrendering its interest in real property. See Conclusion of I.aw No.1.
In all of the other cases cited by appellant, such as: Minnesota
Ontario Paper Co. vs. Register

&

&

Tribune Co., 219 N .W. 321; Appeal of

Crockett, 154 Atl. 180; Richardson vs. Taylor, 60 Atl. 796, there was a letter
written which clearly conveyed the intent that the check should not be cashed
if the disputed amount involved were not determined to be paid and settled in fuli.

POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL AS TO FAILURE TO FIND ESTOPPEL
SHOULD BE BARRED DUE TO PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE
TO PLEAD THE SAME.
Plaintiff United American Life is not the real party in interest in
this suit. The title company and its underwriter is. By United American Life
bringing suit, as the plaintiff, it was able to obtain judgment against Johnson
Land Company, Franklin D. Johnson and Glendon E. Johnson, and their wives
(R .152) , for all damages and indebtedness due to the breach of warranty in the
Warranty Deed from Johnsons to the plaintiff on December 1, 1976 (Exhibit 661·
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The Green River water rights were so valuable that plaintiff not only wanted a
lien of $185, 000. 00 on the property (Exhibit 43) , but three years later it acquired
the fee simple title. The title company , because they had issued their previous
Trust Deed lien, then insured that plaintiff was the fee simple title owner, without
exception as to the Bank's lien, in January, 1977 (Tr .114).
The evidence is without dispute that the Bank made no
representations to plaintiff or the title company that it would accept only $50, 000. 00
and release its lien securing payment of $150 ,000. 00. United American Life had
reneged and breached its commitment to purchase the loan from the Bank, when
the loan was initially made (Exhibits 5, 18 and 20; Tr .25). The Bank had no
knowledge that the $50,000.00 check (Exhibit 75) represented funds which were
sent to the title company by plaintiff as a part of the refinancing deal .
Plaintiff (not Frank Johnson) wanted to obtain the first lien on the Bar-70 Ranch
property, and Frank Johnson "agreed to try and get it for them" (Tr. 52).
Plaintiff knew very well that the Bank would not reconvey its
$150, 000. 00 collateral for payment of $50, 000. 00 by them. So, plaintiff sent the
money to the title company to see if $50, 000. 00 would pay off $150, 000. 00. With
this history of plaintiff putting Frank Johnson on the spot to see if he could get
a first lien for them, and the Bank going unsecured, it is galling for plaintiffappellant to state (at page 29) in its Brief:
United American Life, as a third party, did rely upon
Zions' acceptance of its funds and acquiescence in the
terms under which the $50, 000 check was delivered.
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This is the exact opposite of the truth, and testimony in this case.
No estoppel was pleaded, which the trial court noted, at the conclusion of the tr·.~
(Tr .174).
No representations were ever made by the Bank to the plaintiff.

ni

Bank didn't even know in January, 1974, that plaintiff was involved in the deal'
The trial court stated " . . . there's nothing in the evidence from which the Cou,1
can find that the Bank was aware of the refinancing arrangements that Mr.

John~

was making through United, or aware that the Title Insurance Agency was goinil
be the disbursing agency and therefore that they misled anybody, knowing what
the facts were.

. . . There was no record that the bank had any knowledge in

this, and therefore misleading based on the knowledge they had.

. ..

"There very might possibly be some estoppel provision come in if
they suffered a loss as a result of somebody else's misconduct. But we can't get
into that since Title Insurance Agency is not a party to this particular suit .. ,
(Tr .175).
"So therefore the Court concludes this does not constitute a conditiCll
delivery. Had it been shown that the Bank knew of this, was aware of it, lookea
at it and said, 'All right. We'll take it then. Fine. We've got a conditional delivery.'

But otherwise there's nothing in the evidence to show that that was

brought to the attention of the authorities. Well, I don't want to speculate how
it was done, because there is nothing in the evidence how it got in except it wa:
done by mistake as far as the Bank was concerned" (Tr.176-179). The Court
should read all of the trial court's remarks, which constitute his verbal findings
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omitted for the sake of brevity.
If the plaintiff, or the title company had sent a letter with the check,

stating clearly their intent to Wayne Hintze, who they knew was the only officer
of the Bank with authority to release the collateral, they would have immediately
received their money back.

As can be seen from Exhibits 17, 18, 19 and 20, the

plaintiff had no compunction in writing directly to Mr. Hintze in 1971, when it
came to a matter of informing the Bank that United American Life would not honor
the commitment to purchase the loan. But, when the delicate task of getting the
Bank to release for $50, 000. 00 came up , they were unwilling to telephone, write
or approach Wayne Hintze directly.
The money ($50,000.00) which was paid to the Bank was Frank
Johnson's proceeds of the new loan refinance agreement made with plaintiff, pursuant to the Loan Modification Agreement (Exhibit 44) . The money did not belong
to the title company, nor to United American Life. The argument concerning
estoppel is made as though the title company has already sustained a loss because
it parted with $50, 000. 00 of its own funds in reliance upon a promise to release,
made by the Bank. This is not so. The loss to the title company is because it
wrote a title policy first insuring that plaintiff had a first lien on the premises on
January 23, 1974, then insuring that plaintiff was the owner of the property and
that the Bank no longer had any lien thereon.
If the title company had demanded the return of the money at any

time , prior to suit, they would have received it, because the Bank still had a
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first lien on sufficient valuable collateral to pay the loan. The Complaint did
not seek return of the money, because had the Bank returned the money, the
loan balance with accrued interest would have been that much more, and the
Bank would have foreclosed its first lien. The money really belonged to Frank I
Johnson, and he never demanded its return.

i

The plaintiff tried to pull a fast one on the Bank. The plaintiff haol
reneged on its commitment to purchase this loan (Exhibits 18 and 20), as it hao1
on many others, and it knew that its request for a reconveyance for 33% payment!
would have been emphatically denied. Plaintiff may have known of the practic1
of the title company in immediately issuing its title policies. Plaintiff's title
policy was dated and issued January 23, 1974, two days before the check was
issued. The check was not cashed until March 1, 197 4.
When the title company insured that the plaintiff was the fee simpl<
title owner in January, 1977, they were then ready to take the position in cour!
that the Bank was not secured; that it had no lien. Still, there were no letters
to the Bank advising it that any foreclosure would be resisted. Frank Johnson'i
financial condition was steadily worsening, and the Bank's efforts at collectini
on an unsecured debt would have been greatly impaired, but the title company
waited to see if the Bank could collect. This failure to notify the Bank that it
had lost its lien by cashing the check would have been met in court with a counil
claim for damages, estoppel and waiver by the Bank against the title company,
for the four years' delay and failure of the title company to demand the return
1

of the money and notify the Bank of the title company's position. In the meann e
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(November 11, 1975), Frank Johnson was promising to make payment to the Bank
" . . . on a negotiated sale on most of the ranch property and since they are selling
to a co-op who are selling their interest on a share basis . . . (Exhibit 63) . See
also Exhibits 64, 65 and 67 which letters are all written as though the Bank was
still a first lien holder on the Bar-70 Ranch.
The overall result is that counsel for the Chicago Title Company
chose not to make the title company the plaintiff in this suit. As stated above,
plaintiff has judgment against the Johnsons, because of the Warranty Deed
running to plaintiff.

The Brief argues equitable or promissory estoppel when

no representations or promises were made by the Bank, and when the matter
was not pleaded or tried on that theory.
There are no other facts relied upon to constitute estoppel, than in
the argument that there was an accord and satisfaction. However, accord and
satisfaction require an agreement, and consideration where there were none,
whereas promissory estoppel is argued as though the element of a clear understanding and an agreement, and consideration (to-wit: the payment of the additional
$100, 000. 00 plus interest) are not necessary. It would be a grave mistake to
classify some of the Utah cases seeking the final satisfaction of the debt without
full payment, under the legal doctrine of accord and satisfaction, and some cases
with exactly the same facts under the heading of estoppel. Could you have a
promissory estoppel or conditional delivery and acceptance of a check for
$50, 000. 00 if the secured Trust Deed Note was $150 ,000. 00 and no consideration
given

for the release of collateral where the debt is liquidated and not in dispute?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-28-

CONCLUSION

In conclusion , the law should place the burden on the debtor (or
third party) seeking a full and complete satisfaction of a debt, a judgment, an
I

invoice or a trust deed for less than full payment by taking care to put in writini''
the complete accord and understanding of the parties with a signed acknowledge!
ment by the creditor, as legally binding as a release agreement signed between I
lawyers. The statute of frauds sought to achieve this when the creation or
surrender of any interest in land was involved.
This case was a factual dispute over whether or not an agreement
had been reached, and whether or not any consideration was paid for the

rele~'

of a first lien securing $150, 000. 00 upon payment of $50, 000. 00. The trial court
ruled against the plaintiff on all issues. The plaintiff-appellant has completely
misstated the facts in its Brief on Appeal.

Respectfully submitted,
GREENE, CALLISTER

&

NEBEKER

Richard H. Nebeker
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